tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN December 10, 2015 8:01pm-9:49pm EST
announcer: coming up tonight on c-span, hearing on increasing military effectiveness. after that, remarks on the changing demographics from the israeli president/ and the hearing on the impact of terrorism on global oil markets. thanks to air force and navy senior officers on increasing military effectiveness. they testified before the senate armed services committee on thursday for one hour and a 45 minutes. >> well, good morning. mccain: we have reviewed the reforms on our defense acquisition management and personnel system, and our past few hearings have considered what most view as the essence of
goldwater nichols, the roles and chairman's of the joint chiefs of staff, and the commanders. this morning, we seek to understand how goldwater nichols has impacted the effectiveness of u.s. military operations, and what reforms may be necessary. we are pleased to welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses, who will offer insights from their many years of experience and distinguished service. general norton schwartz, president and ceo of business executives for national security. admiral james, former european commander and u.s. southern command or. currently the dean of the fletcher school of law and diplomacy at tufts university, and frequent appearances on various media outlets. dr. christopher lamb, director of the institute and the
national defense university. more than anything else, the goldwater nichols act was the result of escalating concern in the congress and the country by the effectiveness of u.s. military operations in the vietnam war, the failure of the hostages in iran and grenada all pointed to the defense enterprise the need to be addressed for the sake of national security, and particular, goldwater nichols insured community and the forces jointly. as we have explored in previous hearing, many questions remain about the balance our military is striking between core competitiveness, competencies, and joint experiences. as it relates to combat effectiveness, there is no doubt -- as one former chairman of the no otherefs put it -- country can match our forces on the battlefield and fight jointly. the subject today relates to the many steps hold water nichols
took to improve the command. and made commanders asked responsible to the president and secretary of defense for the preparedness of commands. it also removed the joint chiefs of staff from the operational outn and permitted forces of command from approval. commanders were given the ability to issue authoritative direction on all aspects of operations, joint training and logistics, and internal chain of command, and personnel within the responsibility. these steps were effective in establishing clear command authority, and responsibilities that translated to a more effective fighting force than we had in the 1980's. however, 30 years later, we have to take a hard look at this command structure -- in light of current threats and how our model of war fighting has evolved. the that states confronts the
most diverse and complex set of crises since the end of world theii, from china, russia, growing asymmetric capabilities of nations -- ranging from iran to north korea. and the persistence of islamic extremism and cyber terrorism, these cut across regional structures embodied by geographic combatant commands. so we must ask, what are the current combatant command structures that best allows to us to succeed in the 21st century? should we consider structures organize less around geography? at the same time, as numerous witnesses have observed, while combatant commands were originally envisioned as the war fighting arm of the military, the department of defense -- that function has largely migrated as a joint task force,
especially on an ad hoc basis in response to emerging contingencies. this suggest that people have identified a shortcoming in the current design, and have adopted measures to work around the system, as we see quite often. this should inform our efforts to reevaluate and reimagine the command. at the same time, combatant commands have come to play a very important piece time diplomatic function. these developments argue for this change, and at a minimum, it would call into question the top-heavy and bloated structures that we see in the command. time and again during these hearings, we have heard how increases in military and civilian staff have persisted, even as resources for war fighting functions are increasingly strained. as former secretary of defense michele flournoy pointed out
this week, combatant command staffs have grown to 38,000 people. that is nearly three divisions worth of staff in just the combatant commands alone. we have to ask if this is truly necessary, and whether it is improving our war fighting capabilities? at the same time, we have to examine whether the duplicate functions in the joint staff, combatant commands, and subordinate commands can be streamlined? that includes the question of whether we really need all of the current combatant commands? do we really need a north and south com? do we really need a separate com headquartered in germany, when the vast resources reside elsewhere? we have to revisit the role of the chairman of the joints nicholsnd the goldwater strengthens the commanders at the strength of the services.
secretary of defense robert gates raised this issue when he testified before this committee, because of his frustration with the lack of responsiveness. many of our witnesses have discussed whether the chairman hashe joint chiefs statutory authority to perform the strategic integration of the department of defense all too often seems to do poorly, integrating priorities, efforts, and resources across regions, across domains of military activity, and across time. balancing short-term and long-term requirements, the question has been raised -- whether the chairman should be placed in the chain of command, with the service chief and combatant commanders reporting to him? testimony for and against -- have heard testimony for and against. these are questions that have
direct bearing on the effectiveness of u.s. military operations. and as a consequence, on the well-being of our war fighters. we go it to them to look at this seriously, ask tough questions, challenge gold assumptions, and embrace new solutions, if and when it is needed. i look forward to the testimony, senator reid? senator reid: let me join you in welcoming the witnesses. i have had the village of working with general schwartz. and the admiral as medication commander, in the defense department now. i deeply appreciate. gentlemen,ery much as the chairman said, we have undertaken a very rigorous -- under his direction -- review of goldwater nichols. and we heard just a few days ago from secretary of defense, former secretary of defense michele flournoy, about one of the initiatives.
it has become a routine bottom-up staff exercise that consumes many man-hours, rather than a top-down leadership exercise that sets clear priorities and allocates risks. one of the things i would hope the witnesses talk about is the planning process, the formal and informal process, how we can improve that/ that is just one of the items/ i think there is a long and important list of topics that we could discuss. the role in the authorities assigned to the staff, whether he should be placed in the chain of command for military operation, an improving structural reform to combatant commands and field activities, and the potential benefits of adopting organizational changes, including consolidation and functional teams to achieve efficiencies and provide senior militaryand
leaders more timely recommendations. in previous hearings, our witnesses have observed better capitalizing on the gains achieved through those improvements may require significant changes to enter agency national security structure and processes, as well ,s this was made by jim walker the godfather, if you will, of the goldwater nichols. no matter how you transform the defense department, it is quite broken. and the problems that confront this nation require an inter-agency response. executed ato national security mission by itself is long going, we do not have the ability to integrate everything that exists. i think it is important to keep that in mind. and the chairman, again, let me commend him for beginning this process with the department of defense. i hope it is a catalyst on the
issue for serious review by other committees and other agencies about how, together, we can improve security in the u.s. thank you. senator mccain: welcome, general schwartz. general schwartz: thank you, sarah mccain and ranking member reid for improving dod's internal governments and defense organization by the goldwater nichols reforms. it is a privilege to return to his room and offer a few related ideas on how to improve performance in the department of defense. it is a special pleasure to sit beside the finest flag officer of my generation, jim. while there are many issues that warrant petition, resource allocation and overhead reduction and joint credentialing of military personnel and the potential for
consolidation, among others, i wish to focus this morning on the three that i am persuaded that hold the greatest promise for particularly positive outcomes. they are the role and authority in the chairman of the joint , rightsizing the combatant commands and establishing the joint task forces for the execution of operational missions. i'm certainly prepared to address the other matters you mentioned, at your discretion. as a formerence member of the joint chiefs of staff, the functional combatant commander in the chief of service, i have come to the conclusion that the chairman's informal role in supervising the combatant commanders in the jcs is insufficient for the demands of our time. while it is true that delegated authority from the secretary of defense is an alternative, there
should be no doubt in the armed forces about the directive authority of the chairman. subject to the close and continuing scrutiny and oversight of the secretary of defense. fortegic guidance employment, force allocation trade-offs between combatant commands and establishing strategic priorities for the armed forces should not be the result of bureaucratic negotiation. or the exclusive application of personal persuasion. but rather, the product of strategic leadership. this capacity is constrained by the chairman's inability to exercise executive authority on behalf of the secretary of defense. and the remedy i suggest is to place the chairman and the line of supervision, between the secretary and his or her
combatant commanders. combatant commands are complex entities, number oone of which are alike. some with regional response abilities and functional roles, the command strives to serve both peacetime, crisis response, and war fighting obligations. the composition of the combatant command staff clearly reflects the inherent tensions in this excessively broad mission array. peacetime administration, deterrence, training, and partner engagement versus maintaining the capacity to conduct complex contingency operations in peace and war. the proliferation of resource directorates, joint intelligence centers, security assistance program offices, typically j4s,
partner engagement, typically j9s, are the result of this expansive assigned mission set. and over time, the war fighting role of the combatant commands have evolved to be honest exclusive use, some would suggest excessive use, of joint task forces, up to and including four-star led assigned missions. the simple question in my mind is, can a combatant command, no matter how well tailored, perform each and every associated task with equal competence? i do not think so. and the attempt to infuse greater inter-agency have to into the combatant command has come in my experience, detracted the core operational focus in either peacetime or in conflict.
how have we squared the tension between combatant command peacetime and wartime roles? i would argue by again, extensive use of joint task force organizations to execute operational missions. it is my conviction that the efficacy of the task force employment model is beyond dispute. the national counterterrorism joint task force and straights conclusively -- demonstrates conclusively in my mind the enduring vallevalue of well-trained and equipped joint task forces. it may well be that high performance parallels exist for national joint task forces in and airace, maritime, domains, as well. what we should continue, however, or what i should say we should discontinue, is the
proliferation of joint task forces and each combatant command, with the attendant service component and headquarters staff. task force 510 in the pacific command might qualify, however, as an exception to the rule. in short, mr. chairman, we need to have within the armed forces a strategic leader who can exercise executive authority. we need to aggressively taylor combatant commands headquarters, composition to its core mission or missions, and refrain from creating subordinate task forces out of service headquarters. and finally, we need to drive toward employment of long-term, highly proficient national joint task forces for combatant command employment. thank you, terry mccain, ranking member reid. and members for your attention,
i trust my presentation will assist in advancing the noble cause of goldwater nichols reform. senator mccain: admiral? admiral: other distinguished members, pleasure to be back with you. generale year with schwartz, who was not only a service chief, but a combatant commander, as well as being director of the joint staff -- there is no one who can talk more coherently to these issues than him. and as well my good friend, dr. christopher lamb, who can best address the questions of planning and strategy that senator reid raise the moment ago. i spent 37 years in uniform, i spent probably a decade of that in the pentagon. i wish i had been at sea during those years. but in that time, i managed to serve on the staff of the secretary of defense, the secretary of the navy, the chief of naval operations, and the
chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. i have seen sort of inside the building, and as senator mccain mentioned, i was twice a combatant commander -- once in europe and once in southern command, latin america and the caribbean. so i am going to simply walk ideas that ifive think might be interesting for this committee to discuss and debate, none of these are fully formed ideas. but i think they relate to the objective of what the committee, i think very correctly, seeks to do as we sit here kind of three decades after goldwater nichols. and they all rate in one way or the other how the department is organized. i will start with one i think that is controversial, but ought to be considered. and that is doing need a cyber force for the u.s.? i would invite you to think about where we were 100 years ago. we had an army, navy, and marine
corps. did we have an air force? of course not. we barely flew airplanes 100 years ago. i would argue today that it feels like that moment a few years after the beach at kitty hawk. clearly, we need a cyber command. and i think we are moving in that direction. but i think it is time to think about whether we want to accelerate that process, because our vulnerabilities in the cyber domain, in my view, are extraordinary. and we are ill-prepared for them. some part of our response will have to be done by the department of defense. and the sooner we have not only a cyber command, but in my view, a cyber force -- small, capable -- i think will be well served. i think we should have a discussion. of they, to the question inter-agency. and the power of how to bring those parts of the government together, i think an
interesting organizational change to consider would be to at each of the regional combatant commands to have a ambassador is a u.s. or perhaps some other senior diplomat. would continue to need a military deputy, and order to conduct military operations. but a great deal of what combatant commands do is diplomatic in nature, and i think having a senior representative from the interagency present would be salutory. this is been tried, and i think it would be an effective an interesting idea to consider to look at combatant commands. thirdly, and the chairman mentioned this, in my view, geographically, we have too many combatant commands.
we have six today. i think we should seriously consider merging north and south com and emerging u com and africa com. there are obvious deficiencies in doing so, operational additional benefits that derive. and i think finally, it is a way to begin reducing what has been correctly identified as the bloat in the operational combatant command staffs. would associate myself with general schwartz and a number of others who have testified with the idea that we should consider independent, general staff in strengthening the role of the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. practice, as a combatant commander, i would very typically all the chairman.
check signals with the chairman. i would not undertake a radical departure without talking to the chairman. inhink putting the chairman the chain of command, as general schwartz as outlined and a number of other witnesses have mentioned, is efficient, sensible, and frankly, codifies what is in effect today in many ways. in addition, i think the chairman would be well served with what some have termed a general staff. this is the idea of taking midgrade military officers of extraordinary promise and pulling them from their services and more or less permanently assigning them to this general staff. this model has been used in other points i other nations in history. i think it is a powerful way to create efficiencies and avoid duplication, because i doing so,
you can reduce a great deal of what happens in the combatant commands today. so, in addition to strengthening the position of the chairman, i think it would be worth considering whether a general staff model would make sense/ . fifth and finally, i think that we talk a great deal appropriately about joint operations. it is important to remember that joint education is extraordinarily important in ultimately the conduct of operations, the creation of strategy, the intellectual content of our services. so, i would advocate considering whether we should integrate our joint educational institutions. probably by taking the national defense university, putting it back to three-star rank and directivet officer
authority over the nation's war colleges.this would also create intellectualf capability, which could match up well with the idea of a general staff. five of those ideas are controversial. but i think they should be part of the conversation that this committee is on packaging, which is one that is deeply important for the nation's security. thank you. senator mccain: thank you. dr. lamb? dr. lamb: thank you for the opportunity to share my views on proving the -- on improving the effectiveness of military operations. it is a great honor, especially so considering the distinguished service of your other witnesses today -- general schwartz and the admiral. it is the high point of my career to be sitting with them today, and in front of you. and i am really truly humbled by the opportunity.
also, i want to knowledge the presence of my wife, who, in light of the unconventional things i'm about to say, decided i needed moral support. and i agree with her. senator mccain: we will hold her in no way responsible. [laughter] dr. lam: she will appreciate that. i argued for three sets of organizational changes to increase the effectiveness of u.s. military operations. first, to impress the persistent lack of preparedness for irregular threats, i argue we should give u.s. relief for small unit conflict, and the marine corps has the lead for larger irregular conflicts. second, to make the best possible investment in military capabilities and maintain our advantages in major combat operations, i believe we should encourage the use of horizontal teams in the department of defense, and support their work with collaborative management -- whether joint scenarios, operating concepts, risk
metrics, and institutional knowledge. and i completely agree with general schwartz, we should invigorate our approach to headquarters, so we have standing task force to experiment and test with joint concepts. finally, to better integrate military operations with other end meant of national power, i believe we need legislation that allows the president to empower leaders to run inter-agency teams. none of these recommendations are unique to me. and they have all been made before by various groups and individuals. but i hope now is an opportune time for the senate and the leadership in the department of defense to reconsider the merits. in the brief time remaining, i would like to address some likely questions, particularly with respect to horizontal or sometimes referred to as cross-functional teams, because i know that members of the committee have expressed some interest in that. and so, i want to raise a number of questions that are likely to come up in this area.
first of all, it is often asked if all national security problems are not inherently complex, and therefore require cross functional teams? my response to that would be no. it was famously argued the most important judgment a commander has to make is determining the kind of war in which they are embarking, not mistaking it for nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to its nature. the same thing holds true for national security, more generally. we need to determine the problem being addressed. not all military tasks are in physically joint. not all national security missions are intrinsically inter-agency. if we say otherwise, we greatly increase the risk of failing to bring the right expertise. another question that arises is whether all groups with representatives from functional organizations are in effect cross-functional teams?
no. there is a huge difference between a committee and the team in the executive branch. the numbers of a committee, to use some shorthand, typically give priority to protecting the parent organization equity. and the members of the cross-function team give priority to the mission. why do some groups work like teams, others work like committees? for example, why don't all executive branch cross-functional groups work as well an army battalion headquarters, which also has to integrate functional expertise from the artillery, infantry, armor, etc. i think the answer is a difference is the degree of autonomy exercised by the functional organizations, and the degree of oversight exercised by the common authority. and the battalion headquarters, all the participants share the culture, have the obligation to follow legal orders, and
received direct an ongoing supervision from the battalion commander. interagency groups consist from organizations with quite different cultures, different legal authorities and obligations, and no supervision from the only person in the system with the authority to direct the behavior -- the president. another question often raised is whether we do not already have an effect good inter-agency teams with empowered leaders, for example, the state department's country teams/ . ambassadors having given authority by the president. well, first of all, there are notable exceptions. particularly with respect to military and covert operations. but in any case, the ambassador of authority is not sufficient. many are perceived as st,resenting states' interte rather the national interest. and the direct supervision of the president is so far removed that many of the people on the
country team feel they can do that and actually be rewarded either parent organization for doing so. i will stop there, but want to close by anticipating one final reaction to the proposals for horizontal teams. complain thatably this is all rather complicated, and that at the end of the day, we are better off just finding and appointing good leaders. this is an understandable but dangerous simplification. first, as jim likes to say, there is no need to choose between good leaders and organizations. we need both. horizontal teams cannot be employed to good effect without supportive and attentive senior leaders. but neither can senior leaders of functional organizations solve complex problems without organizations that are engineered to support cross-cutting teams. second, in the current environment, leaders simply lack the time to supervise every or
even the most important cross-cutting problems. neither is it sufficient to simply insist that subordinates get along. the heads of functional organization have an obligation to represent their organization's perspectives and expertise. this obligation, reinforced by bureaucratic norms and human nature, ensures the group members with diverse expertise will clash. conflicting views are healthy, but they must be productively resolved in a way that gives priority to mission success, and not less noble factors. dare to sayould that the intense focus on leadership particularly in this town, has always struck me as rather un-american. our founding fathers realize the american people needed more than good leadership. they paid great attention to organizing the government, so that it would work well or work well enough, even if it is not always led by saying, sensitive
ops. we should do the same with respect to the department of defense and the national security system. right now, i do not believe the men and women who go in harm's way are backed up by the best possible policy, strategy, decision-making. that can and should change, and i'm glad the committee is looking into the matter. thank you again for this opportunity to share results from our research from the national defense university. i look forward to answering any questions you might have read senator mccain: thank you very much. let us start with a fairly easy one. is there a reason why we should have a north and south com? and is there a reason for us to have an africa com based in germany, right next to euro command? let me start out with a fairly -- and let me add onto that 1 -- is in there now and need, as much as we are trying to reduce and streamlined, is in there now
a need for a cyber command, given the nature of that threat? general? general schwartz: the original thinking on north com was concerned about having assigned forces to a senior officer, with responsibilities for the u.s. and domestic circumstances. foreclosed at the time the possibility of having a joint command for both north and south america. in this time, now, with the passage of time to consolidate both of those organizations, as the admiral suggested, the africa wasor ferent.t differen it was the place it on the
continent. senator mccain: that did not turn out very well. general schwartz: it did not create but you see ho. but you see with the passage of time, it is a good way -- that is an act of consolidation that certainly makes sense to me. and with respect to cyber com, yes, once they have assigned forces, it is time to establish cyber com as independent com. sir, i think we should merge north and south. not only for efficiencies, but i think there are cultural connections -- canada and mexico, two largest economies in the americas -- into the flow with our work and world to the south. predictably, there will be objections based on norad.
i think that can be easily handled with a sub-unit in some way. was a good experiment, but i think it is time to amend merging it back together -- as you said, the forces are all in europe. and those connections between europe and africa would actually be very positive, and in some sense, well-received in the african world. and cyber command, i have already addressed. it is absolutely time to do a ?rade the real question do we want to go one step closer? senator mccain: that is really important. doctor? dr. lamb: i would make the following observation, i think that decision is best linked to other recommendations that have been made here today, including whether we increase or beef up our ability to field a joint task forces, standing joint task
forces, whether we have a general staff or a chairman in the chain of command. lotink that would impact a the effective span of control that combatant commanders could exercise. senator mccain: thank you. this whole issue of joint task forces is when the most important aspects of it, obviously. betweenere is now a gap the organizations in being and the appointment in every crisis of a joint task force, whether it comes from command or it is obvious that that is where the operations are, finally, in a more philosophical plane, one of the much criticized but yet pretty successful staff structure has been the german staff. names like schleifen, leudendorff, keidel.
and every time we start talking inut centralizing authority the joint chiefs of staff, that issue is raised -- the german general staff system is not something that we want to emulate. and yet, there are others who say it was not because of the staff system that they lost, it was for other reasons. ao, give me more of fundamental view, do you want to centralize this much power in the hands of one individual? or authority, in the hands of this one individual? general? chairman,hwartz: mr. i would not create a general staff. i actually believe there is risk of having the brilliant view become self-serving.
however, it is necessary that a chairman in the chain of command connect to a general staff. by retaining a similar arrangement, as we have now come over the joint staff is a creature of the joint chiefs. you minimize concern about a rogue individual. at least have a robust discussion about the pros and cons of the general staff. admiral: in terms of the concerns raised about the german general staff, you know, that rattles old ghosts in our memories. but in a day, it was political leadership and economic collapse in germany that led to the rise of fascism. the german general staff was perhaps a tool of that. i think here in the u.s. the culture in the military is so strongly one of subservience to
civilian leadership that i would not believe that to be a significant concern, when wade against the efficiency -- when weighed against the efficiencies. dr. lamb: i would second what the admiral said, about there not being a threat to civilian control of the military from a general staff. but i do think it is worthwhile for the committee to ask or take up an issue that michele flournoy raised about consensus. knowoint staff is well for its extensive coordination to ensure consensus afforded to the chairman. i think it would be very interesting to hear from the former and current chairman what they think of their staff performance, and that regard. for the committee to get to the heart of why consensus tends to rule in the way the joint staffs runs. i don't think it is served
particularly well to date. senator mccain: i would make a comment that, being a student of world war ii, they did not have any lawlessness. there were just brilliant guys king whohall, ladyehy, won the most seminal war of modern times. i don't know how we look at that aspect of it, certainly was a factor -- the major factor in winning world war ii. senator reid? senator reid: two issues emerging among many, one, putting the chairman and the chain of command and creating a general staff. there are pros and cons as you point out. and since you give him are some most intellectually honest people i know, it helps us that we propose a lot -- what is the con?
what do you worry about, if we had a chairman in the chain of command, if we did it, we would have to create sort of a buffer against those downsides? general schwartz: the traditional thinking of having the chairman in the chain of command is potential for abuse, for excessive exercise of one's authority, and underlining, as chris lamb mentioned, the fundamental principle of civilian authority. that is the downside. but i believe that, and given my experience, the chairman and the secretary operate so closely in today's environment that there is a level of supervision which mitigates that possibility. but that is a legitimate consideration. putting the:
chairman of the chain, he was still be supportive? general schwartz: of course, exactly. correct. senator reid: so the practical effect would be injecting him between the service chief and the service sector? what does that look like? general schwartz: the practical effect is there an authoritative referee, and he is either the deputy secretary or the secretary. and it seems to me that having someone in uniform with executive authority, probably toervised and contributes effective activity. reid: on both of these issues, the chairman and the chain? admiral: let me take the chairman position first. we have correctly identified it as one of the cons.
i will give you another one. having put that much authority into one person, what if you get an extremely mediocre chairman? someone who is not smart, not effective? we have a very good up and out system, we are probably going to get very good chairman. level of power and authority, you need to worry not only about abuse of power, but lack of capability in it, as well? in terms of the general staff, i've inc think the term would be general staff -- the officers would have been plucked out of level, and they would not have the robust level of operational experience that we see on the joint staff today. that would be a con. again, my intuition is that both the pros outweigh the cons. century dr
senator reid: dr., your comments? lamb: the relationship between the chairman and the secretary has been extremely tight. i'm not sure what the value added inserted so informally into the chain of command is. there are issues there, that some secretary teams have worked very closely, and the secretary's interest in decisions have been passed to the chairman agreed in other cases, you can think of secretaries who have dealt with combatant commanders at length. so i think i would be kind of agnostic on that. but i'm inclined to think there is not a lot of value added to that. the more important decisions the chairman needs to work on our use of force development. this is where we really have to work hard to preserve the qualitative advantages that we currently enjoy. and i think most people agree are diminishing. and there, to get to the issue
of the general staff, i think he needs really dedicated, deep expertise on his staff. and currently, we tend not to have that. we bring people directly and from operational commands who have never worked those brought issues before, we throw them at a problem for a couple of years, then rotate them out. my view would be that more staff,ty on the general it would probably do a good thing on the whole. senator reid: thank you for your service and testimony. >> thank you, gentlemen, for joining us today. it is nice to have you here, some interesting comments. lamb, if your. would leave, in 2009, in relation to the dod secretary bob gates, he said this is a department that plans for war. it is not organized to wage war, and that is what i'm trying to -- wage war. is bo
that is from bob gates. do you believe it can be fixed? share your thoughts on that. schwartz: i believe the model for employment, once again i redesigned my earlier point, byhave migrated perhaps more chance and by design, but the joint task forces are the way we operate today. and it seems to me that entitiesnalizing those in the same way that we have operationspecial national joint task force is the model for the future. in the other operating domains. >> thank you. admiral: i agree with general
schwartz. as a general proposition, we should make the point that the department of defense operates very effectively in a number of venues. we could be better and more efficient if we had a model like general schwartz is suggesting, in my view. lamb: i appreciate the question. i am personally fascinated by secretary gates and his tenure as secretary of defense. i think he is a remarkable man. he is been very candid in his memoirs about the experience he had leading the department of defense in a time of war. i have looked at what he had to say very carefully. and i think it is interesting, and what really seems to frustrate him is that even though we had troops on the battlefield in contact with the enemy, the service chiefs were called to their statutory obligations to raise, train, equip forces of the future. and he cannot get enough ability in the field for the problem we were currently trying to master.
and this is a source of frustration to the secretary, and i think it underlies the comment you quoted him on. is, in the problem there part, our lack of preparedness for irregular warfare. the services, whether we're talking about preparing for future irregular conflicts, or engaged in them currently, they have always given priority to what they consider the core possibility of fighting and winning the nation's large-scale conflicts. we have never been good at being prepared for a regular war. and i think that is true over the last 60 years. i think we do need some changes there. for me, the solution is to put someone definitively in charge of being prepared for irregular conflict created that is something we have not done. we always turn to the services and say you're equally responsible for being prepared for irregular conflict. they invariably consider a less included case. we do not go to those complex
thinking, planning, prepared with the capabilities etc. i think that is what frustrated the secretary, and i think it can and should be fixed. >> there were a lot of provocative comments the secretary has made. and that is good, because we are spending the time talking about some of those reforms and thoughts that he had agreed in regards to regular warfare, asymmetrical warfare, we really did not starting about -- at least i was not so much aware about it -- until about 15 years ago or so, when really started taking a look at the fourth. thecan we empower an combatant commanders to make the decisions on their own? do we empower or can we empower them to do that? any thoughts, or does it need to be a top-down approach? why can it be a more bottom-up approach and taking those risks? general? general schwartz: i think
combatant commanders will do exactly that. however, it is important to assign missions and to distinguish what the priorities are. that is a function of this -- the pentagon in this town. and we have not been terribly good at that. >> we have not. thank you, general. thank you. >> i will direct these to general schwartz and the admiral. i'm so appreciative when you guys come in or so candid and tell us exactly what you have seen, and your experience. having athing i am hard time with, why you cannot make these changes on the front lines when you are in charge? if the system so bogged down we
are throwing so much stuff here, but how do we keep the separation, the civilian oversight as we do, which is unbelievable. and i'm glad we do it, that is concerned we have to balance. report thathave the found less than 25% or one quarter of active-duty troops were in combat roles, and with majority instead performing overhead activities, and if you look at it from the standpoint of all the pay increases, we are giving the same pay increases to 75% of the people that don't see any action. argue all, i think we need to know from you now, in your role, not being constrained in your remarks, how do we get to where you are able to make the decision when you are in charge and in power? they are saying it cannot be made, the military cannot change.
only under the goldwater acts , we found some he and oversight, and makes it impossible to govern. who makes the decision? the commission be in place? and for those concerned about giving total power to the joint chiefs and the chairman and still having the civilians in control, and advisory capacities, i do not know how to circumnavigate this final question. you both can answer. i know we are talking about north and south com. i would ask the same? national guard and reserves? guarda governor over my and i would have gladly shared with the president, and if the only reason we have the reserves doing what they are doing and the guard doing what they are doing is because of separation of oversight, that is the make any sense to me. we could save a tremendous
amount and use the reserves in a much more i think effective role in a much more cost-effective. but i do not see that happening. so whatever was a chime in, please do. general schwartz: thank you. first, i actually believe that giving the chairman hopefully a very capable individual directive and executive authority would change the dynamic in what you are saying. >> and right now, you are saying that person does not have that? general schwartz: at the moment, he does not. he can encourage, persuade, but he cannot compel. that is not a business-like approach to the problem. secondly, with regard to the atrd and reserve, it is least in part a function of statutory authority, as you are aware as a former governor and
others here on the dais, the responsivea title 10 .o the service leadership and the guard's title 32, a more complex arrangement. i think it is safe to say that at least the army and the air force have a preference for maintaining oath of those entities, because access to the reserve is cleaner and more expeditious in most cases than it is in some cases with the guard. you do touch on an important aspect, which is reforming pay, benefits. i think those authorities derive from all of you here on capitol hill, based on proposals that can calm.
and i think you are spot on. why do we pay in 2003 exactly the same amount of money? ripeally is, in my view, for a new look. in the building, they have the authority to build that in proposals and move it forward. i hope use burn them to do that -- i hope you spur them to do it. i think providing the authority to go into government and move civilians that have been there, just simple authorities over the system would be helpful. to the degree the committee wants to really let your finger, reach up and touched the third rail, you can look at an alternative model. we have an air guard and a land
guard, if you will, we have a coast guard. the coast guard resides, as you will know, in the department of homeland. it is a very different model. if you want to look at efficiencies and structures, that might be an interesting model to look at, as to whether and onains in the air the land, as it seems to work quite effectively, in my view at sea. in terms of the union commission, i would say what the ismittee is doing right now the basis of driving these thoughts forward, and i hope you continue at this. >> senator fischer? senator fischer: gentlemen, recently a friend and i have aen having discussions from 1984 speech by casper weinberger. outthird rule that he laid would be that military forces
should only be committed after the military and political objectives have been clearly defined. there has been criticism lately because of recent campaigns that we have seen in afghanistan and syria, and criticism that perhaps we have not seen that end result really clearly defined. i think in the future complex, especially when we look at the cyber area, it will be a difficult challenge to define what is ahead. i guess i would like to hear from all of you, if you believe these evolving trends are going to continue to change how we look at laying out those objectives in the future, and are we going to be able to look
at a comprehensive strategy, comprehensive plan for the future? general schwartz: the role of civilian leadership is to understand the why and the where. the role of the uniforms is to offer advice. both are essential ingredients of success. the desire for clarity in the important to is those who serve.
without a doubt. i think the clear thing here is at there is a need for that these are complex circumstances. but it is important for there to andupport for the mission if i may offer a piece of advice , it's less than ideal. admiral: i agree. the ideal structure would be clear construction from the political level, a strategy that has been explained to the
american people, has a reasonable level of support, and the military conducts the detailed planning which is the precision piece of this going forward. how to make that link more effective, a lot of what we were discussing today would be helpful in that regard. the degree in which our military can be given that kind of strategic clarity will be the degree to which we are successful. >> would you both say that is a role that we as members of this senate should continue to require? futuret risk even into a maye the nature of warfare change? admiral: yes.
>> dr. lam, if you had comments. >> one of the jobs i had was and overseeing the nations war plans. one of my observations was the operational plans are crystal-clear compared to the strategic guidance we are often to get. witnesses have spoken about strategy and the point of view of need for more gray matter. my view is a little different. i think there are political and bureaucratic forces at work that tend to millie tate -- militate against that. you ask why we don't marshal our resources against that, the answer is too full. in formulating -- twofold. greatnow, there are
political and bureaucratic as incentives for that kind of clarity. there are three ways to attack this problem. the safer thing is to say we .ill do all of those things if you look at all of our public strategy documents, there is a long laundry list of objectives and you don't have that clarity. when it comes to of limiting the strategy, you have bureaucratic forces at play. of convinced after a year study that a lot of popular opinion about what went wrong in iraq is wrong.
if you have real strategy, it exists not on paper but in the minds of the key decision-makers. it's in their minds. if you are going to get a clear, cohesive implementation of the strategy, everybody has to be working together. that did not happen in iraq. detail on whyto but the point is we had people in one part of our national security system working hard to go in one direction and the people on the ground in baghdad supported by other people go in another direction. the results were not good. when it comes to strategy, we have political and bureaucratic problems. there is one reason i favor these cross functional teams. i think they can put the strategy together and have a better chance of implementing it in a unified way. >> thank you.
>> thank you, mr. chairman. i appreciate the senator bringing up the doctrine. think there are many reasons why an authorization is really important. one is the legal requirements of article one and two. the second is the sign of resolve you show to adversaries, allies, troops. the third is the one the doctrine gets at, which is it helps you clash out at the beginning what is the mission goal. -- in president bush presented an authorization right after the attack on 9/11 and congress rejected the originally rented version and came up with something different. the war against isil is one we started on august 8, 2014. weeks, we nowe
have to go on offense but we didn't have a discussion, the administrations presentation of therationale and i fought president for not sending an authorization to congress for essentially six months after the beginning of the war and now it's been 10 months since he sent an authorization. still haven't had the discussion you should have. i think the one burger doctrine is a good way to look at it. -- the weinberger doctrine is a good way to look at it. just walk through if you are looking 15 years ahead, how does the cyber force look? is there a cyber academy? numbered inably thousands of members. quite small.
less than 10,000, probably. what you have today is each service academy building in itself a small cyber academy. i think there would be an educational pipeline, a career path. you have to get away from some of the traditional go to boot camp, shave your head, crawl i'm not sure that will attract the people we need in a cyber force. this may be a highly paid. the closest analogue to what we have is special forces. that's roughly what it would look like. i do believe it's time we get
after this because i think our vulnerabilities are significant. >> a second question to another idea you had. i thought it was intriguing, a civilian deputy within the cocom's. i gather there is an unstated assumption about the nature of the american military mission now, that so much of it is diplomacy. the nations that want us to to trainpecial purpose militaries, so much of it is on the border between diplomacy and military are working out what the japanese situation is, that's to format it as much as military. is that your thinking behind the recommendation? admiral stavridis: it is. the structure as it was in , iect when i was in command had a military deputy and i think you need to continue to have that for the combat operation. but we also had instead of a
full lad, political adviser at the state department, a senior ambassador, and he or she was capable of doing that kind of engagement, diplomatic work, working with hosted nations, helping resolve in the revocable -- innumerable challenges. it's a low-cost and it is also a strong signal to the inner agency about how we want to work together to address problems. >> sounds like a fletcher school dean idea. one last question for you, doctor. the idea you have advocated in your opening testimony about having some primary responsibility for a regular war rather than everybody feeling like a regular wars are a lesser responsibility. talk a little about that. elaborate, if you would.
a. lamb: i think we have parallel with regards to special operation forces in general. hobby services before we combine them had special operation forces. they knew what they wanted to use them for. they want a priority for the service. socom.s created u.s. we have unparalleled capabilities. those have only improved over the last 10 or 15 years. when it comes to working with the host nation forces, we are not quite as sharp. there is a number of complex reasons for that, which have been discussed by many. i think the committee needs to take that issue up with so, leadership -- socom leadership. they intend to improve the
capabilities. with regard to the marine corps, not every problem, not every problem can be handled was a team.special operations the question is who in the department of defense is really responsible for being prepared for that mission? we go on these missions well there -- whether it's panama, somalia, we go not really prepared, kind of learning on the job, seeing the situation demands. not only not having the equipment but not being able to generate it quickly in response to urgent requests from forces in the field. i think we can do better than that. the marine corps would work well in that regard for a number of reasons.it has a history of greater involvement . withalready a joint force
capabilities well integrated. there's a lot of advantages there. we've come to a point where we cannot afford this without some clarification of roles in the department. >> thank you. i want to thank all of you for being here today. admiral, i wanted to ask you about the preposition of commander. we had testimony this spring from general john kelly, the commander, about how the networks are working over our southern border. the sophisticated smuggling network that i can assure you now are being used to devastate my state with how heroin is coming in but also the issue he raised as well was that he haveved adherence to isis
called for filtration of our southern border. i wanted to ask you about your thoughts on that in terms of the use of those networks to not only on things like drugs but also as we look at this terrorism challenge. admiral stavridis: it is absolutely something we should be worried about. this is the convergence of these drug routes, which are extremely with the, possibility of moving them to the really dark end of the spectrum, weapons of mass destruction with narcotics. threatsse higher level convergence, we are at a greater risk. ist we should do about it exactly what we're talking about here, thinking holistically about how you create a network to combat a network. this is a very sophisticated, private, public elaboration with
international abilities ranging from moving submarines with 10 tons of cocaine to aircraft's. you need to bring the interagency, special operations. this also argues for emerging of northcom and southcom. there is a quick basket of ideas. >> i appreciate it. i don't love anyone else wants to comment. i also wanted to -- not to pick on you today, admiral, given up our position as the commander of nato, what we've seen recently iran, on october 10, they conducted a ballistic missile test. we learned they tested a missile
on november 21. -- first of all, a clear violation of u.n. resolutions. also from what we understand, the report suggests it has a range of 1200 miles. that would give them a capability of hitting eastern europe and places we are concerned about. asking why aren't we responding to this? what do you think our response should be? should there be some response? it strikes me as a very important issue because it is already in light of the jppoa. they're violating existing u.n. resolutions and it seems to me if there isn't some response to us, they are going to continue not only as this doesn't bode
for the jvp away, but assumed capability that could go even further to hit the u.s. admiral stavridis: as i've said often, we are concerned about iran's nuclear program but it's a much bigger problem than that. they see themselves as an imperial power dating back 2.5 millennia. they are currently in control of five capitals of the region. jcpoa isnney l.a. -- going to shower resources upon them. there are a highly dangerous opponent. iran toe should hold the commitments they have made and if that means that agreement is broken and we therefore returned to a sanctions regime, we need to face that. all ofy, we need to use
our clandestine, intelligence capability to truly understand what's going on. third, we need to stand with our sunni allies in the region and of course, with israel, who will be the bulwark against this kind of expansion. we looked at the missile defense system and should continue to move in that direction. that's kind of a beginning but i iran willen -- continue to be a geopolitical threat to the u.s. >> thank you. >> thank you all very much for your service and for being here today. , you talk about of theing the structure military to set up special teams that have commitment to mission whatpost -- opposed to
groups of bring to task. i really like that idea. i think one of the things if we look at the private sector, one of the things they've figured out is that the top down approach is not as good for decision-making. one of the challenges -- i guess i should ask the general and admiral what you think the challenges are of trying to move from what has been a traditional hierarchy to a structure that allows that team approach to really address the challenges we are facing. general, do you want to start? general schwartz: i don't know if the committee -- here's an example.
a be the best recent example of how the team approach produces extraordinary results. chris lamb'sne is while does work, there's evidence of that. there is a new generation of military leadership that gets it, i think. we should support that, encourage it. through your oversight, we should mandate it. core questiontz: going forward. what mitigates against it, what makes it difficult is the built in structure of the military. this is an organization where one million people get up and that on the same outfit. start cracking that
mentality. there is a generational shift. this is not an on and off switch between a highly chaotic silicon valley-like entity. toward to dial that more team approaches, international cooperation's, strategic to medications without losing our ability to deliver lethal combat power. >> you spoke about the coast guard having a different model. one of the things i remember after the bp oil spill when they are talking about the response in rescuing people -- not the oil spill, hurricane katrina -- was that the coast guard was very effective in responding
both of and on the bp oil spill able to makewere decisions on the spot without having to check with anyone. what's different about the coast guard model and how do you is effective about that or should we be looking at transferring what's effective about that to address some other challenges? we spent some time looking at the coast guard model. theirast guard would say and their model training model is different from some of the other services. they are used to thinking about problems across functional ways. they has some natural advantages. >> can you explain when you say
their leadership model is different. what's different that gives them that ability to focus? they beginvridis: their lives at the coast guard academy with an appreciation of they are but one entity within the department of homeland security, which has 19 different entities within it. they know this border between -- they know they straddle that border. law-enforcement, rescue, environmental. ofre mentality is simply one cooperation, working together. betterrd to find a integrated organization than the coast guard. i think we could learn a lot from that. general schwartz: they have much greater experience with state and local leadership than
typically does through the active duty forces. thank you all very much. >> thank you. your years of service. bit on yourcus a recommendation all caps with -- with regard to north com and southcom. we are interested very much in what's going on in the arctic. there is a requirement for the secretary of defense to put together an arctic operations plan for the first time.
we think it's progress. , onegiven your background of the many challenges we have there is when you look at the scene oft's a classic different combatant commands -- i'm sure you all noticed the massive russian buildup. yesterday, there was another article about a new missile-defense system. huge exercises. we're looking at getting ordered the only airborne dct in the entire asia-pacific. as you know, that takes a lot of training to have your forces up there well trained and be able
to operate in 30 below zero. i would appreciate your views on the arctic but also that merger idea and how it would enhance or diminish. we think there should be more attention on the arctic given all that's going up -- going on up there right now. it's importantz: the arctic be assigned as a mission to one of the combatant commands. that has yet to happen. it should transpire. that's .1. point one. two, we only have one operating icebreaker. this is unthinkable for the u.s. clearly, that coast guard platform, we need more of that
and we need the other kinds of wherewithal that will allow us to assert our sovereignty in the arctic. >> we have one and the russians have 40, i believe. admiral stavridis: treasure has 38 plus two -- russia has 38 plus two icebreakers. the chinese have 16 icebreakers. have eight. this is beyond a pedestrian point. i agree with the signing it to u.s. northern command in its entirety. i think it would not be diminished by the merger. when you look at the level of activity to the south and what m is doing, i think it because itluable
would further solidify her integration with canada. lastly, we should be working with nato. this is a nato frontier. canada and the u.s. are nato nations and we need to get that border as importantly as we do of the borders of the alliance in eastern europe and to the south on the mediterranean. general, could you speak to the strategic location of the forces up there? when you speak about having it completely with regards of having it under north command, do you think the operational forces should be also under the command given they are very oriented toward the asia-pacific. you and the strategic location of alaska is such that those air forces, army forces
can really be anywhere in the northern hemisphere within 7, 8 hours. would you mind speaking about that? general schwartz: if the constraint of signed forces to see domestic can be overcome, that makes sense. alaskagn those assets in that have the opportunity to reinforce america's claims in the arctic as well as be deployable for other missions that might be a sign is certainly the right approach. admiral stavridis: we spoke a lot about the unified command plan, which kind of divides the world. the other important document is called the forces four document, assigns those forces. it's renegotiated typically every two years.
that would be a very important, new way to think about this assignment. >> thank you. >> thank you. a couple quick points. on the icebreakers. it's preposterous we don't have more significant icebreaker capacity given what's happening in the arctic. secondly, would you agree it would be advantageous to the -- to a seed -- acede -- could i ask why agnostic? >> i am concerned about our
willingness to protect navigation around the world and the way other nations are interpreting their control over the areas. >> my concern is other nations are going through that process making claims and we're standing on the sidelines. your gestures won't show up in the record. we are muchridis: better inside that treaty then outside it in terms of protecting our rights. we could have a long hearing and i'm sure such has been done. call me back on that one any time. >> i want to associate myself with the comments of senator ayotte. it's hard to interpret exactly what they are doing. some think it's the struggle of the hardliners.
on the other hand, it would be very dangerous for us to establish the precedent of blinking violations. great believer that implementation is as important as vision. i voted for the jcpoa. it was based on the understanding it would be enforced and i think this could be interpreted as an early test of our resolve. i take it you agree, general. general schwartz: i certainly do. if it's a violation of u.n. resolutions, we should call that out without hesitation. admiral stavridis: i agree as well. i have been hopeful of this agreement but i'm increasingly skeptical that it will be the right step for u.s. national security. it certainly gives way to the negative side of that equation.
>> dr. lamp, and your remarks he spoke about how we need to be thinking about unconventional warfare and suggested several areas. you speak about persuasive communication. in my view, there are two friends with the war with isis. one is military, the other ideas. we're badly losing the war of ideas. it strikes me that a huge gap in our national strategy. my sense is it doesn't have the priority it should. would you agree? dr. lamb: i absolutely would. i think there are two issues here. organizationally, we are not well organized to treat the issue of communications. we get public affairs, public diplomacy, -- >> usia was abolished 15 years ago. dr. lamb: we don't have a
dedicated organization to deal with this anymore and we are confused about -- americans are sensitive about government control or use of information and we are losing this game. i would concur on the substantive front, we are having political problems with deciding the best way to deal with the issue with the fact that some terrorists happen to also be muslim and islamic. we want to emphasize that the islamic religion is peaceful and tolerant but we do have this thatn within that religion sees the world differently and our ability to deal with that in a forthright way is handicap. unsurprised by the number of senior leaders -- i am surprised by the number of senior leaders who have said from their memoirs
in their tours of duty that this is an achilles' heel for us and we still haven't effectively identified the enemy we are up against, how to turn that issue into something that the islamic world debates itself about what it's going to do about this strain within it. organizationally, we are really on our heels in this regard. that's where this battle will be won or lost in my view. 200,000e now 100,000, jihadists. billion muslims. that's the battlefield. there can only be one within the muslim community but we have to lead it. withve to at least work the non-jihadist muslim community worldwide. general schwartz: i would close by saying we need to give voice
to those who have escaped isil -occupied areas. >> seems to meet natural. admiral stavridis: it is a battlefield but it's also a marketplace and we have to compete. we have to recognize that. it's a very important aspect of how we communicate. we are pretty good at dominating markets. we should bring some of those skills here. >> it's ironic we are the people who invented facebook and twitter and we are losing on that front. thank you very much, gentlemen. one additional question. about combining several of the combatant commands. had?here any savings to be
if so, we would like to quantify them because in fiscal year 17, we will face a $15 billion shortfall somewhere real like to be. we are going to have to find some places where it can be saved in staff, personnel, noncombatant areas. perhaps you have an immediate response or for the record. in the schwartz: business world, we call those synergies. i cannot offer a number but certainly there are those in the department who could answer that wouldon for you and recommend you press for that. admiral stavridis: yes, there are savings. i would recommend not only pressing the department but getting someone on the outside to take a good look at that. thank you very i appreciate your testimony. >> i appreciate any comments about the hearts and minds but
first you have to killed him. -- kill them. as long as the perception is that they're winning, they will also win in other areas. i believe that one of the reasons why these young men are most attracted is they think they are joining a winning cause. bernardinouch as san and in paris are one of the greatest recruitment tools they have. until we beat them on the that ourld, i think messaging efforts will be severely hindered but i also agree that there is going to be the mostght using advanced technologies and i would also point out we still have a big problem with the ability now of isis to be
contacted and direct a young man or woman to a secure site. that's just not right. it's not right. that isads nodding and not recorded. admiral stavridis: i agree on both fronts. gets into thelso cyber piece of this. there are ways we can track, control, roddick it in the cyber world. i also agree the leading edge of this has to be hard powered. in the long game, it's a mix of hard power, smart power. at the moment dealing with the forces against us from the islamic state, we half to go hard now. did you have any comment, doctor? dr. lamb: i think this is a good
of the military information support. if you look at how they are trained and equipped, it's not to the same levels of efficiencies. i think there is room for improvement there. >> thank you. dr., as a graduate of the tuition of which you are i want toemployed, thank you for your continued and i think the admiral and general for your many years of service. this will probably be the conclusion of this hearing we are having as we try to address ,his entire issue of reform ability to get into the challenge, to meet the challenges of the 21st century.
coldwater nichols could never have come from within the pentagon. intend on a bipartisan basis to work with the pentagon and secretary carter as closely as we possibly can but i think it's a well-known that we have to lead. exclusion of the pentagon but it certainly is the responsibility i think we have and i'm proud of the modest measures we have taken this year is reallyk next year where we can make a significant impact and the series of hearings we are now concluding with now gives us an excellent basis for the kind of reforms that need to be made.
it is disappointing to our constituents when i go back to arizona and someone asks me about a $2 billion cost overrun of one weapon system. it's hard to defend, hard to justify. then when we see the combat capabilities going down and yet the staff and support going up, we have still -- we are still not able to conduct an audit successfully for the department of defense and no one can tell many contract how personnel are employed. a pretty large task ahead of us. if we pursue the principles you have recommended to us today, some of those are aspects of this challenge will follow.
you have been very helpful and admiral, i asked the panel yesterday's you all would topare notes of condolences be delivered to senator reid saturday afternoon. would be much appreciated. >> so army. admiral stavridis: skill maybe. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015] [captioning performed by national captioning institute]
>> coming up, remarks on the gender demographics of israel by the israeli president. he and members of congress make remarks on the san bernardino shooting. journal,xt washington ray lahood talking about his book which chronicles his career in politics. in a look at the $1 trillion spending bill in congress. washington journal live every morning at 7:00 a.m. eastern on c-span and you can join the conversation on facebook and twitter.
on friday, foreign affairs and pentagon correspondents will speak about reporting on the conflicts. you will be live with the women's foreign policy group at noon eastern on c-span3. >> all persons having business before the honorable supreme court of the u.s. managed to get their attention. >> monday on c-span's landmark , ernest it was 23 years old in 1963 when he was arrested in phoenix on suspicion of kidnapping and raping a young woman. after two hours of questioning, he confessed and signed a statement. trial, maranda was convicted and sentenced to 23 years in prison but his lawyer argued he
had not been told the right to an attorney or the right to remain silent. the case went to the supreme court. follow the case of miranda versus arizona and the evolution of leasing practices in america with our guest, jeff rosen and ssell.a 9:00s live monday night at eastern on c-span, c-span3, and c-span radio. for background on each case, of the landmark cases companion book available for $8.95 plus shipping at www.c-span.org. remarks by the israeli president on the changes needed in the country to represent all citizens.
[applause] general schwartz: thank you so very much. thank you. i see the english language is much more richer. i read the translation when i was speaking about the new israeli agenda and it was translated as the new israeli order. it is not a new israeli order. we have no orders in our democracy. at least we hope we would never have orders in our democracy. i really believe the translation they spoke about maybe